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ABSTRACT
Due to the fourth industrial revolution, industrial applications make
use of the progress in communication and embedded devices. This
allows industrial users to increase efficiency and manageability
while reducing cost and effort. Furthermore, the fourth industrial
revolution, creating the so-called Industry 4.0, opens a variety of
novel use and business cases in the industrial environment. How-
ever, this progress comes at the cost of an enlarged attack surface
of industrial companies. Operational networks that have previously
been phyiscally separated from public networks are now connected
in order to make use of new communication capabilites. This mo-
tivates the need for industrial intrusion detection solutions that
are compatible to the long-term operation machines in industry
as well as the heterogeneous and fast-changing networks. In this
work, process data is analysed. The data is created and monitored
on real-world hardware. After a set up phase, attacks are intro-
duced into the systems that influence the process behaviour. A time
series-based anomaly detection approach, the Matrix Profiles, are
adapted to the specific needs and applied to the intrusion detection.
The results indicate an applicability of these methods to detect
attacks in the process behaviour. Furthermore, they are easily inte-
grated into existing process environments. Additionally, one-class
classifiers One-Class Support Vector Machines and Isolation Forest
are applied to the data without a notion of timing. While Matrix
Profiles perform well in terms of creating and visualising results,
the one-class classifiers perform poorly.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Attacks on industrial enterprises have increased over the last two
decades, in frequency as well as in impact [5]. A number of dif-
ferences between home and office Information Technology (IT)
networks makes classic IT security solutions only partly applicable
to the industrial environment. Heterogeneous networks, consisting
of physically distributed devices with operation times of several
decades make updates and fixes difficult. Communication protocols
such as Modbus/TCP [24, 25] are employed that do not contain
means of authentication or encryption. That means any attacker
having obtained access to the communication network is capable
of reading and injecting messages. For two historic reasons, in-
dustrial, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) or
Operation Technology (OT) networks are not secured in a fashion
deemed appropriate for home and office IT [16]. First, OT networks
are supposed to be physically separated from IT networks. Sec-
ond, OT networks and their connected devices are considered to
be highly application specific, thus making propagation and ex-
ploitation by an attacker difficult. Both reasons do not hold true
anymore. Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products in the indus-
trial area such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) make
set up, maintenance and operation of industrial applications much
easier due to common interfaces and programming libraries. Those,
however, make it easier for an attacker to prepare for exploitation
as well. Furthermore, the fourth industrial revolution introduces an
abundance of novel use and business cases [1]. Most of them rely
on the communication and computation capabilities of Internet of
Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices. This
breaks the physical separation of networks, creating access routes
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to OT networks. Even if no such access is possible, attackers have
successfully managed to move laterally to the OT networks in the
past after breaking the IT network perimeter [7]. As a result, effi-
cient intrusion detection in industrial networks is crucial for the
secure and sound operation of industrial applications. However,
several attacks are capable of masking sensor outputs once the
attacker gains access to the device under attack. Thus, correlation
of several sensor values, preferably over separate channels, can be
employed to detect attacks.
In this work, machine learning- as well as time series-based meth-
ods for anomaly detection are applied to one set of process data of
a real-world industrial process, containing several sensors and actu-
ators, controlled by six PLCs. As the data was created and captured
in a experimental environment, ground truth about the attacks is
available, i.e. there are labels and the assurance that the data is
labelled correctly. The contribution of this paper is twofold:
• The feasibility of multi-sensor anomaly detection based on
machine learning is evaluated
• a time series motif discovery algorithm is extended for anom-
aly detection
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2, an
overview of the state of the art is provided. The data set analysed
in this work are presented in Section 3, the algorithms used to
evaluate the data are introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, they are
evaluated. This work is concluded in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
Due to the increasing relevance of industrial intrusion detection,
it is a widely regarded topic in the research community. Schneider
and Böttinger use autoencoders in order to detect real attacks in an
industrial data set in an unsupervised fashion [30]. A framework for
assessing the impact of cyber attacks in production environments is
presented by Giehl et al. [13]. They evaluate their approach on the
SUTD Security Showdown (S3) 2017 (S317 ) data set provided by the
iTrust, Centre for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University of
Technology and Design [17]. The attack data has been generated by
a contest to affect the process environment with real attacks. Goh
et al. use Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to detect attacks on
a Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) in a data set by the same institu-
tion [15]. They evaluate the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT ) data
set [18], the same data set that has been evaluated in the course
of this work. Creating realistic data sets for industrial intrusion
detection is crucial for the development and testing of intrusion
detection systems. A special kind of neural networks, Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM), is used by Feng et al. [9]. They employ a
multi-level approach in order to detect attacks in a gas pipeline
data set. Knapp and Langill present approaches to secure indus-
trial networks [19]. The detection of intrusions in power system
networks is discussed by Yang et al. [32]. Larkin et al. present a
summary about the evolution of SCADA security systems [20].
One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) as a machine learning
algorithm to detect novel and unknown attacks is presented by
Maglaras and Jiang [23]. Approaches to detect attacks in Modbus
data with the help of signatures is presented by Gao and Morris [12].
The security of future industrial applications with the integration
of the IIoT is addressed by Plaga et al. [28, 29].
Pump
Raw Water
Tank
Pump
Mixer
NaClNaOClHCl
P1 P2
UF System
UF Feed 
Pump
UF Feed 
Tank
P3
Dechlorin.
NaHSO3
RO Feed 
Tank
RO Feed 
Pump
UV System
P4
Cartridge
Filter
RO System
P5
UF 
Backwash T.
UF 
Backwash P.
P6a
RO 
Permeate T.
P6b
Figure 1: Relation of Sub-Processes
3 DATA SET
An industrial data set is evaluated in this work. It is presented by
the iTrust, Centre for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University
of Technology and Design and is called SWaT [14, 18]. It is taken in
an industrial environment with a real-world underlying process
into which attacks have been introduced. The data set is gathered
from a water processing facility that was set up in a laboratory
context. It consists of the following six sub-processes:
• P1: Raw water storage
• P2: Pre-treatment
• P3: Membrane Ultra Filtration (UF)
• P4: Dechlorination by Ultraviolet (UV) lamps
• P5: Reverse Osmosis (RO)
• P6: Disposal
The relations of and transitions between the sub-processes are
depicted in Figure 1. First, the water to be processed is stored,
followed by a pre-treatment with different chemicals. After that,
UF is applied, followed by an UV process. It is then pumped to
an RO process. Depending on the level of cleanliness, it is either
stored in a clean water reservoir or fed back to the UF process. The
environment in which the PLCs controlling the sub-processes are
set up is depicted in Figure 2. The PLCs in this figure correspond to
the sub-processes with the respective number. In total, they control
51 sensors and actuators. An exhaustive list including description
can be found in thework ofGoh et al. [14]. They distinguish between
four types of attacks, describing the type and listing the number of
occurrences in the data:
• Single Stage Single Point (SSSP): Single stage attack on one
point in the process, 26 instances in the data set
• Single Stage Multi Point (SSMP): Single stage attack on multi-
ple points in the process, 4 instances in the data set
• Multi Stage Single Point (MSSP): Multi stage attack on one
point in the process, 2 instances in the data set
• Multi Stage Multi Point (MSMP): Multi stage attack on multi-
ple points in the process, 4 instances in the data set
4 ALGORITHMS USED
In this work, three different algorithms have been used to determine
attacks in the data set: OCSVMs, Isolation Forests andMatrix Profiles.
OCSVMs and Isolation Forests have been used to analyse the data
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Figure 2: Schematic Overview of the Process Environment
sets, as described in Section 3, on packet basis while Matrix Profiles
have been used to perform a time series analysis of the data sets.
4.1 One-Class Support Vector Machines
OCSVMs are a one-class classifier that is trained with one class in
order to determine whether elements of the test case do or do not
belong to that class. It is well suited for applications where one class
is predominant, such as anomaly detection. Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) are a large-margin classifier. They were introduced by Boser
et al. in 1992 [3]. Elements in an n-dimensional data space are
separated by an n + 1-dimensional hyperplane. The elements are
described as tuples as shown in (1) [4].
(xi ,yi ), i = 1, ...,m,y ∈ {−1, 1} (1)
x is a vector of dimension n, y is an attribution indicating affiliation
to one of two classes. In classic SVM , both classes are present in
the training data, leading to a hyperplane separating both classes
so that the distance of every element to the hyperplane is maximal.
In one-class classification according to Schölkopf et al. [31], the
distances of data points from the hyperplane are maximised. A
quadratic minimisation function (2) minimises the area surrounded
by the hyperplane according to ν .
min
ω,ξi ,ρ
1
2 ∥ω∥
2 +
1
νn
n∑
i=1
ξi − ρ
with
(ω × ϕ(xi )) ≥ ρ − ξi∀i ∈ {1, ...,n}
ξi ≥ 0∀i ∈ {1, ...,n}
(2)
ν ∈ (0, 1) characterises the fraction of outliers that are tolerated as
well as the training size.ω and ρ are used to describe the hyperplane.
After training, the decision function (3) decides whether or not an
element is part of the trained class or not.
f (x) = sgn((ω × ϕ(xi ) − ρ) (3)
4.2 Isolation Forest
Similar to OCSVM , Isolation Forest is a one-class classifier [21].
The goal is to isolate anomalous data points in a data set. This is
done by training an ensemble of decision trees on a data set and
then considering the path length until convergence as a metric for
isolation. Densely populated areas converge quickly, while isolated
areas take longer to converge. A data sample is described by (4).
X = {x1, ...,xn } (4)
A tree is created by selecting random attributes q as well as a split
value p until either:
• the height limit of the tree is reached,
• |X | = 1 or
• all data in the tree is of the same value.
The average path length is calculated and derived from this, the
path length of each sample is calculated and an anomaly score can
be derived. In sorting the path lengths in ascending order, anomalies
are found at the top of the list.
4.3 Matrix Profiles
Matrix Profiles were developed in 2016 by Yeh et al. [33] as an
algorithm for motif discovery. A time series data set was split into
sequences of lengthm. The distance of each sequence starting at a
point in the data set from each other sequence is then calculated in
a sliding window fashion, e.g. with the z-normalised distance (5).
d(x ,y) =
√
m∑
i=1
(xˆi − yˆi )2
xˆi =
xi − µx
σx
, yˆi =
yi − µy
σy
(5)
After applying Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient [2] (6)
corr (x ,y) = E((x − µx )(y − µy ))
σxσy
=
∑m
i=1 xiyi −mµx µy
mσxσy
,
(6)
where
µx =
∑m
i=1 xi
m
, µy =
∑m
i=1 yi
m
(7)
and
σ 2x =
∑m
i=1 x
2
i
m
− µ2x , σ 2y =
∑m
i=1 y
2
i
m
− µ2y . (8)
The Euclidean distance relates as in (9) [26],
d(x ,y) =
√
2m(1 − corr(x ,y)) (9)
the resulting metric for distance calculation is described in (10).
d(x ,y) =
√
2m
(
1 −
∑m
i=1 xiyi −mµx µy
mσxσy
)
(10)
x andy are time series, µ is the respective mean and σ the respective
standard deviation. The minimal distances are derived and stored
in a matrix, hence the name. A high minimal distance indicates an
outlier, as no sequence in the time series is similar. Correspondingly,
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a low minimal distance indicates at least one similar sequence in
the series.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, the application of the algorithms introduced in
Section 4 on the data set as presented in Section 3 is evaluated. All
algorithms employed in the course of this work only need to be
trained on normal data. This is based on the assumption that in
real applications, anomalous data is sparse. Furthermore, since the
anomalies of interest in this work are due to attacks, they might
be unique in their characteristic and thus hard to train a priori.
Having one-class classifiers or predictors is justified by the reality
of industrial environments that data from normal operation of
productive systems is available in abundance while anomalous data
is hardly present.
5.1 Matrix Profiles
In this work, Matrix Profiles are applied to the data set in order
to determine thresholds of the minimal distance as well as create
an additional metric: the number of similar instances. Preliminary
work shows the effectiveness of Matrix Profiles for the detection of
attacks in process behaviour [8]. The reference implementation of
Matrix Profiles was used and customised for the application pur-
poses. In Figure 3, the level of raw water tank LIT-301 is shown.
In this figure, about 100 000 time steps of normal behaviour are
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Figure 3:Matrix Profile of LIT-301
preceding about 150 000 time steps of behaviour during which ten
attacks occur. The attacks are indicated and numbered in the bot-
tom row by a boolean value 1. Additionally, the value of the sensor
is shown in the first row and the minimal distance as calculated
with the Matrix Profile is shown in the second row. It can be seen
that all attacks can be detected by the increase in minimal distance
as calculated with the Matrix Profile. The hyper-parameterm was
set to 500. Additionally, a sensor measuring differential pressure in
the backwash-process DPIT-301 was analysed in the same fashion,
shown in Figure 4. Its behaviour is more rugged than the behaviour
of LIT-301, the hyper-parameterm is set to 2000, the period of the
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Figure 4:Matrix Profile of DPIT-301
sensor value. Attacks 1, 2, and 3 are detected in this process as well,
similar to attacks 4 and 5, 6 and 7, as well as 9 and 10. Attack 8 is
lower than noise in the minimal distance and thus not detectable.
Since Matrix Profiles have been shown to perform well for such
time series [6], especially in conjunction of different aspects of the
process, they are evaluated for an extension in this work. Since
Matrix Profiles calculate the minimal distance, an attack that occurs
twice and has the same characteristic each time is not detected as
an attack anymore, since it is already known behaviour. This means
in praxis, an operator would have to detect every attack on the first
try; in historical analysis, even this would not be possible. In order
to create a more versatile approach, the instances of a motif are
counted. An epsilon value is set to compare the current motif to all
other motifs, all motifs whose distance is smaller than the epsilon
value are added to a list. In doing so, the number of similar motifs
can be extracted. Even if an attack occurs more than once and the
masking of attack and normal behaviour results in the same pattern,
the number of similar motifs is small, indicating a rare behaviour
despite a low minimal distance. In addition to the standard Matrix
Profiles, an extension has been implemented: In Figure 5, this infor-
mation is added in the line Similar Values. This figure depicts data
consisting of 85 000 instances from non-malicious data as well as
about 60 000 instances of malicious data in which three blocks of
attacks are expected. Attacks are indicated by a one in the corre-
sponding line. It can be seen that the attack blocks are responsible
for the highest minimal distances, as expected and already shown
in Figure 4. Additionally, the similarities correspond to the Matrix
Profiles. As a threshold for similarities, 20 was set. Even though
there are two regions, around 18 000 and 32 000 milliseconds with
zero similar values, the largest areas correspond to the attacks. Ad-
ditionally, a time interval of 45 000 milliseconds has been analysed
to get a better view of the behaviour, at the downside of fewer com-
parisons of motifs. This leads to a higher false positive rate, nicely
shown for LIT-301 in Figure 6. However, the same consideration of
DPIT-301 shows that the minimal distances are most prominent for
the attacks, presented in Figure 7. The prominent length of zeros
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Figure 5:Matrix Profile and Similiarity Information of DPIT-
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Figure 6: Matrix Profile and Similiarity Information of LIT-
301 in a Smaller Interval
for the similar motifs is presented as well. From both these features,
information about anomalies due to attacks can be derived.
5.2 Isolation Forest and OCSVM
As described in Section 4, OCSVMs and Isolation Forests are one-
class classifiers. That means they are trained on one class of event
while being capable of classifying between two classes in operation.
In this work, the normal operation of the data set was employed as
a training data set. It contains 499 220 instances of 51 sensor values
each, monitored during eleven days of operation. After training,
the classifier was tested on the remaining four days of operation
during which several attacks occurred. The results are listed in
Table 1. In general, the performance in these experiments is com-
parably bad. In case of Isolation Forest, pre-processing is able to
improve the classification performance in terms of accuracy while
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Table 1: Performance of One-Class Classifiers
Preprocessing OCSVM Isolation Forest
Accuracy F1-Score Accuracy F1-Score
bool
None 0.121 4 0.216 5 0.262 4 0.205 8
0 mean 0.121 4 0.261 7 0.618 2 0.187 3
linear 0.224 4 0.212 5 0.576 2 0.188 2
PCA 0.360 0 0.199 5 0.551 4 0.193 3
non_bool
None 0.121 4 0.216 5 0.266 0 0.206 3
0 mean 0.121 4 0.216 5 0.447 1 0.195 3
linear 0.240 9 0.210 6 0.405 7 0.196 8
PCA 0.351 1 0.199 3 0.405 7 0.199 2
reducing the F1-score. In this case, applying Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) procudes the best results. PCA is a method to map
multidimensional features to a lower dimensional feature space
with the most important features being the most prominent in the
output vector [27]. The same goes for OCSVM , with a smaller im-
provement because of pre-processing and a lower classification
quality overall. There are several hyper-parameters to be tuned.
However, Changing ν and γ for OCSVM as well as changing the
contamination factor or feature size for Isolation Forest result in any
significant improvement. Furthermore, the data has been evaluated
with and without taking boolean values into consideration, noted
in Table 1 as bool and non_bool preliminary experiments indicate
that ν as a metric for training errors and support vectors does not
have much influence on the result. Additionally, scaling the data
before training and testing leads to only positive classifications in
preliminary tests with a reduced data set. Thus, all data in Table 1
are derived from the unprocessed data set. It should be noted that
this classifier does not contain a notion of timing, in contrast to the
Matrix Profiles and LSTMs.
6 CONCLUSION
The digitisation of industry creates the demand for an increase in in-
dustrial cyber security solutions. Due to legacy reasons, they should
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integrate into existing applications. The time series-based approach
Matrix Profiles is promising in terms of legacy-capabilities as well
as detection. Furthermore, since little tuning of hyper-parameters
is required, it is easy to set up and robust to different kinds of data.
Furthermore, even though the detection capabilities are increased
with a larger data base for comparison, no formal training is re-
quired. The addition to Matrix Profiles, presented in this work, can
be used to detect attacks that occur multiple times and provide an
increased level of security and traceability. One-class classifiers on
the other hand require extensive training with a large amount of
data. Despite pre-processing and tuning on hyper-parameters, they
do not perform satisfactorily for the data evaluated in this work.
Generally speaking, the adaption of novel techniques for intrusion
detection is necessary in order to meet the current requirements.
Combinations of anomaly detection methods with deception solu-
tions, such as presented by Fraunholz et al. [10, 11]. Additionally,
presenting the results in a fashion that is easily understandable
for human operators, especially non-experts in cyber security is
crucial for effective defense against attacks. Lohfink et al. present a
visual representation of the results obtained in this work [22].
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